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Contemporary research into socio-cognitive foundations of organizational learning tends
to disregard the distinction between declarative and non-declarative knowledge. By
reviewing the literature from organizational learning research and cognitive psychology
we explain that this distinction is crucial. We describe the foundations of organizational
learning by referring to models that consider the interplay between individual and
collective knowledge-related processes in organizations. We highlight the existence of a
research gap resulting from the finding that these approaches have widely neglected
the existence of different types of knowledge. We then elaborate on characteristics
of declarative and non-declarative knowledge in general, consider organizations as
structures of distributed cognition, and discuss the relationship between organizational
knowledge and practice. Subsequently, we examine the role of declarative and non-
declarative knowledge in the context of organizational learning. Here, we analyze (1) the
cognitive and social mechanisms underlying the development of declarative and non-
declarative knowledge within structures of distributed cognition; and (2) the relationship
between alterations in declarative and non-declarative types of knowledge on the one
hand and changes in organizational practice on the other. Concluding, we discuss
implications of our analysis for organizational learning research. We explain how our
integrative perspective may offer starting points for a refined understanding of the sub-
processes involved in organizational learning and unlearning and may support a better
understanding of practical problems related to organizational learning and change.
Keywords: organizational learning, declarative knowledge, non-declarative knowledge, co-evolution,
organizational routines, skills, habits, organizational practice
Introduction
Organizational learning is based on continuous alterations in an organization’s repertoire of
knowledge, which broaden its potential range of organizational practice; such changes in practice,
in turn, may lead to the development of new knowledge (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Understanding
how organizational learning takes place within organizations, therefore, requires an understanding
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of (1) how knowledge is being developed, and (2) how the
development of knowledge and practice mutually inﬂuence each
other. These questions are at the core of organizational learning
research.
Since the publication of seminal work, for example, by Fiol
and Lyles (1985) and Levitt and March (1988), many diﬀerent
disciplines have explored the foundations of organizational
learning from various perspectives (Nicolini and Meznar, 1995;
Easterby-Smith, 1997; Popper and Lipshitz, 2000; Schulz, 2002;
Bapuji and Crossan, 2004; Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011;
Argote, 2013). Many of the existing prominent models posit that
organizational learning is based on the interplay of cognitive
(individual) and social mechanisms (March, 1991; Kim, 1993;
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Spender, 1996; Crossan et al.,
1999). In these models, however, the underlying cognitive and
social processes and their interrelations have not been suﬃciently
speciﬁed.
More recent socio-cognitive approaches have developed
these perspectives further. These approaches view organizational
learning as the outcome of reciprocal interactions among
cognitive and social processes that are embedded in
organizational structures and cultures (Akgün et al., 2003;
Elkjaer, 2004; Casey, 2005; Antonacopoulou and Chiva, 2007;
Brusoni and Rosenkranz, 2014). Organizational knowledge
is conceived to be actively produced and co-constructed by
individuals with diﬀerently embedded beliefs, values, and
practices. These approaches have explained many of the complex
phenomena involved in organizational learning. Nevertheless,
there is an important white spot in this socio-cognitive stream of
research. While older models of organizational learning (Cohen,
1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Kim, 1993; Nonaka and Takeuchi,
1995) were aware of the distinction between declarative and
non-declarative knowledge, more recent approaches refer
broadly to “knowledge” and do not distinguish between these
concepts. This is problematic as neuropsychological research
has identiﬁed substantial structural and functional diﬀerences
in declarative and non-declarative memory systems (Anderson,
1996; Squire, 2004; Sun, 2012; Conti-Ramsden et al., 2015).
These diﬀerences in memory systems are responsible for how the
cognitive foundations of organizational learning processes are
built. They shape the individual and collective, that is, cognitive
and social mechanisms involved in organizational learning. It
is the aim of the present article to further develop the current
understanding of organizational learning by re-introducing
the distinction between declarative and non-declarative
knowledge.
We will discuss the consequences of this distinction with
regard to both the development of knowledge and changes in
organizational practice. We will synthesize existing conceptual
contributions and empirical ﬁndings from organizational
learning research and cognitive psychology to explain that (1)
diﬀerent mechanisms underlie the development of declarative
and non-declarative knowledge within organizations, and that
(2) declarative and non-declarative knowledge each contribute
in a diﬀerent way to changes in organizational practice. This
distinction between declarative and non-declarative knowledge
may not only enhance theory in continuous organizational
learning, but may also enable a better understanding of practical
problems.
In the following sections, we ﬁrst provide a brief overview
of research into foundations of organizational learning:
We introduce the distinction between declarative and non-
declarative knowledge, characterize organizations as structures
of distributed cognition, and describe the relationship of
knowledge and practice within organizations. Secondly, we build
on existing research to elaborate on how each of the two types of
knowledge are developed and how this development is related to
alterations in organizational practice. In the concluding section,
we discuss implications of this analysis for future research.
Foundations of Organizational Learning
Two of the most seminal models that have established the
groundwork for research into the foundations of organizational
learning are Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) SECI model (Teece,
2013), and Crossan et al.’s (1999) 4I framework. Both models aim
to explain the concrete and complex, individual and collective,
and cognitive and social mechanisms involved in organizational
learning. The SECI model describes how knowledge is co-
created by individuals within organizations through continuous
verbal and non-verbal communication. According to this
model, individuals are introduced into a social system through
socialization, in the course of which they learn from each other
mainly through co-experience. If individuals externalize their
knowledge to others (i.e., express it verbally), knowledge of
multiple individuals can be combined, thereby leading to new
insights. These new insights are then again internalized (i.e.,
learned) by the individuals involved.
The 4I framework has a slightly diﬀerent focus than the SECI
model. Its purpose is to explain the diﬀerent phases within an
organizational learning process by describing how knowledge
transcends from the individual to the team and organizational
levels. According to the 4I framework, organizational learning
involves four phases, intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and
institutionalizing. In the intuiting phase, knowledge is created
based on experience at the individual level. In the interpreting
stage, the individual links the newly generated knowledge with
existing knowledge, before that knowledge is shared with a group
of colleagues in the integrating phase. In the institutionalizing
phase, routinized actions are developed, tasks deﬁned, actions
speciﬁed, and organizational mechanisms put into place.
Both the SECI model and the 4I framework provide
starting points for understanding how individual and collective
knowledge co-evolve within organizations through the interplay
of diﬀerent cognitive mechanisms and communication processes.
While the co-creation of individual and collective knowledge
is the explicit focus of the SECI model, the 4I framework also
describes how knowledge is transferred from the individual
to the collective through cognitive mechanisms (intuiting
and interpreting) and social processes (integrating and
institutionalizing). In addition, the relationship of knowledge
and practice plays an important role in both models: In the
SECI model, socialization is based on knowledge sharing during
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collective practice. In the 4I framework, the organizational
learning process is not ﬁnished until the newly generated
knowledge is institutionalized as common practice. Nevertheless,
both models tend to remain vague about the concrete, underlying
cognitive and social mechanisms, leaving important questions
unanswered, such as “How exactly do individuals create new
knowledge?”, “How do diﬀerent individuals combine their
ideas?”, or “How can processes, once institutionalized, be
revised?”
Expanding on the SECI model, the 4I framework, and other
concepts, more recent socio-cognitive approaches have analyzed
how individuals co-create knowledge within organizations, and
how the development of knowledge is related to the development
of practice (Akgün et al., 2003; Berends et al., 2003; Elkjaer,
2004). These approaches have integrated important psychological
concepts such as emotions, intelligence, or improvisation (Akgün
et al., 2003), have shown that organizational practices are actively
structured (Berends et al., 2003), and have developed insights into
how organizations and individuals mutually shape each other
(Elkjaer, 2004). However, those same approaches have widely
neglected the existence of diﬀerent types of knowledge. The
need for such a distinction, especially between declarative and
non-declarative types of knowledge, has clearly been highlighted
both in previous research in the ﬁeld of cognitive psychology
(Anderson, 1996) and in earlier models of organizational learning
(Cohen, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Kim, 1993) and is also
implied in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) SECI model.
In the present article, we will elaborate on characteristics
of declarative and non-declarative knowledge in the context of
organizational learning and demonstrate that these knowledge
types strongly diﬀer with respect to (1) how they are
developed within organizations, and (2) how they are related
to organizational practice. In order to lay the groundwork for
our overall conceptualization, we will clarify the diﬀerences
between declarative and non-declarative knowledge types,
analyze organizations as structures of distributed cognition where
cognitive and social processes mutually inﬂuence each other, and
describe the general relationship between knowledge and practice
within organizations.
Declarative and Non-declarative Knowledge
Research in cognitive psychology and neuro-psychology has
identiﬁed substantial structural and functional diﬀerences
between declarative and non-declarative memory (Squire, 2004;
Sutton et al., 2010; Sun, 2012). Declarative memory refers to the
capacity for the recollection of facts and events, which allows for
comparing and contrasting remembered material. Examples of
declarative memory are a pharmacist’s retention of knowledge
about diﬀerent types of drugs and their eﬀects (facts), or a
consultant’s retention of knowledge of diﬀerent cases she has been
working on (events). Non-declarative memory refers to several
additional instances of memory that are expressed through
performance rather than through recollection. Non-declarative
memory is the store of non-declarative knowledge, such as skills
and habits (Squire, 2004). Examples of skills are motor skills, like
a sculptor’s ability to carve stone, or cognitive skills, such as an
interpreter’s ability to simultaneously translate spoken words into
a diﬀerent language. Examples of habits include a farmer’s process
of feeding cattle every morning or an oﬃce worker’s particular
way of starting the work day by turning on his computer and
checking e-mails.
Human memory has three main tasks (Sutton et al., 2010).
First, incoming information must be processed and “encoded”;
second, information must be retained and “stored” in some way;
third, information must be accessed and “retrieved”. Declarative
and non-declarative memories operate according to diﬀerent
principles with regard to these three stages (Squire, 2004;
Ferdinand et al., 2010). In the case of declarative memory, an
important operational principle is the ability to detect, encode,
and store what is general and what is unique about a single
entity. In other words, declarative memory is about making
distinctions which lead to the development of increasingly
abstract representations of concepts. Non-declarative memory,
in contrast, is procedural (i.e., knowing how to do things)
and embodied; the key mechanism for building non-declarative
knowledge, such as habits and skills, is the repetition of the same
procedures.
Sometimes, this distinction between declarative and non-
declarative knowledge is equated or at least closely related
(Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011) with the distinction between
tacit and explicit knowledge as introduced by Polanyi (1967,
1975). Tacit knowledge is characterized by the fact that it
is diﬃcult to express verbally. That is, someone may know
something, but is not able to transfer this knowledge to someone
else in words. Explicit knowledge, in contrast, is verbally codiﬁed
and may thus be expressed verbally, which makes it easier
to transmit to other people. Considering the properties of
declarative and non-declarative memories described above, it can
be concluded that knowledge which is stored in non-declarative
memories tends to be tacit (hard to express verbally, “embodied”),
whereas knowledge which is stored in declarative memories
is basically explicable. However, Polanyi (1967) stressed that
explicit knowledge always has a tacit basis and people may
be able to express some types of (previously) tacit knowledge
linguistically if they focus their attention upon it (Tsoukas, 1996).
In other words, tacit knowledge is a necessary component of
all knowledge and to a large extent tacitness is more a matter
of focus and attention than a property of a certain “piece of
knowledge”. As a consequence, the distinction between tacit and
implicit knowledge is not identical with the distinction between
declarative and non-declarative knowledge types. The distinction
between declarative and non-declarative knowledge is based on
structural and functional diﬀerences and is, therefore, more
relevant and guiding to organizational learning research than the
distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge.
Organizations as Structures of Distributed
Cognition
According to socio-cognitive perspectives, organizational
learning is based on modiﬁcations in individual knowledge, that
is, on individual cognitive processes. Therefore, comprehension
of these cognitive processes is relevant to understanding
organizational learning mechanisms. Individual phenomena
alone, however, cannot explain complex organizational
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phenomena, which is what organizational learning involves.
In order to understand how knowledge is created within
organizations, it is necessary to understand how cognitive
and social processes are related (Foss et al., 2010; Hodgson,
2012). Explanations of organizational phenomena must be
grounded in explanations that include both individual and social
relations.
Multiple concepts have been presented that aim to describe
how knowledge of diﬀerent individuals is being integrated
within organizations (Tell, 2011). In this article, we follow
the socio-cognitive tradition that regards organizations as
social structures of distributed cognition, where individual
knowledge is continuously being exploited and further developed
through the communication, integration, and combination of
individually held declarative and non-declarative knowledge
(Tsoukas, 1996; Thompson et al., 1999; see also Hutchins,
1995a,b; Salomon, 1997; Baber et al., 2014). This idea of
distributed knowledge that exists within the organization and
that can be combined to successfully accomplish organizational
tasks has been incorporated into a number of theories, such as in
the communities of practice model (Wenger, 1998; Wenger and
Snyder, 2000; Brown and Duguid, 2001; Kimmerle et al., 2013),
or in the concept of transactive memory systems (Wegner, 1986;
Lewis and Herndon, 2011; Hecker, 2012; Hewitt and Roberts,
2015).
In such structures of distributed cognition, complementary
knowledge of diﬀerent individuals is accessed through the social
networks and relationships of people within the organization.
In aviation, for example, an air-traﬃc controller and a pilot
need to combine their complementary knowledge of the
current situation (the air-traﬃc controller has knowledge of
the situation in the airspace and at the airport, and the pilot
has knowledge of the situation on the plane) and closely
collaborate to make sure that a plane can land safely. In
addition to knowledge that exists in individual cognitive systems,
collective knowledge within organizations may be embedded
in artifacts (e.g., documents, wiki texts, and databases) which
can be accessed by the organization’s members to achieve
their goals (Riss et al., 2007; Hecker, 2012). In order for the
structure of distributed cognition to be eﬃcient, however, it
is essential that there is not only complementary knowledge
but also “common ground” (Clark and Brennan, 1991), that
is, some knowledge that is shared among group members.
In order to collaborate successfully, both the pilot and
the air traﬃc controller in the example above need shared
knowledge on ﬂight regulations and on basic meteorological
principles.
In line with these perspectives, we regard knowledge
within organizations as distributed (complementary or
shared) knowledge that exists at diﬀerent locations (in
the cognitive systems of individuals as well as in artifacts)
and that is continuously being further developed through
diﬀerent forms of communication. Because distributed
knowledge may be declarative or non-declarative and
may appear in diﬀerent shapes (van den Berg, 2013),
communication here is broadly deﬁned as the process
by which individuals interact and inﬂuence each other
(Craig, 1999). This deﬁnition includes oral communication,
communication via shared artifacts (e.g., documents
and devices), and non-verbal forms of communication,
such as watching another person carrying out an
activity.
Organizational Knowledge and Practice
Another prerequisite for developing further the foundations of
organizational learning is to understand the relationship between
organizational knowledge and practice. In general, knowledge
and practice are strongly interrelated in their development, as
knowledge is both sustained in practice and manifests itself
through practice (Berends et al., 2003; Elkjaer, 2004; Nicolini,
2011). One important aspect of organizational learning is
the process of generating modiﬁcations in knowledge through
practice. Conversely, the acquisition of new knowledge may
lead to the improvement of existing practice (e.g., increased
eﬃciency) or it may lead to the development of new practice
through better knowledge (Crossan et al., 1999; Feldman,
2000). A modiﬁcation in organizational knowledge may enable
organizational unlearning (intended modiﬁcation of practice) or
result in unintended organizational forgetting (Tsang and Zahra,
2008). Finally, organizational knowledge may not be exploited
in practice at all, but only exist as latent potential for behavior
(Hargadon and Fanelli, 2002).
There is not a one-to-one correspondence between knowledge
and practice: Knowledge does not always result in respective
practice and changes in practice may be observed in organizations
that cannot be directly traced back to changes in particular
knowledge structures (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Crossan
et al., 1999).
Declarative and Non-declarative
Knowledge in Organizational Learning
In order to further advance research into foundations of
organizational learning based on the distinction between
declarative and non-declarative knowledge, an analysis is needed
which leads to a reﬁned conceptualization of
(1) the cognitive and social mechanisms underlying the
development of declarative and non-declarative knowledge
within structures of distributed cognition, and
(2) the relationship between alterations in declarative and
non-declarative types of knowledge, and alterations in
organizational practice.
Therefore, in the following sections, we ﬁrst integrate
existing research from multiple disciplines to adopt a co-
evolution perspective which enables us to consider in detail the
cognitive and social mechanisms involved in the development of
declarative and non-declarative knowledge within organizations.
Then, we synthesize ﬁndings from existing research to describe
the diﬀerent ways in which changes in declarative and non-
declarative knowledge are related to changes in practice within
organizations.
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The Co-evolution of Individual and Collective
Knowledge
As outlined above, existing socio-cognitive approaches do
indeed analyze how individuals co-create knowledge within
organizations (Akgün et al., 2003; Berends et al., 2003; Elkjaer,
2004), but they do not elaborate on diﬀerences between the
declarative and non-declarative types of knowledge in these
collaborative learning processes. One model that provides a ﬁrst
step in this direction is the co-evolutionmodel by Kimmerle et al.,
2010a; see also Cress and Kimmerle, 2008; Oeberst et al., 2014;
Kimmerle et al., 2015).
Kimmerle et al. (2010a) investigated individual and collective
mechanisms involved in the co-evolution of organizational
knowledge through shared digital artifacts such as wiki articles or
social tagging systems. Their model integrates Luhmann’s (1995)
theory of social systems and Piaget’s (1977) theory of cognitive
development and considers individual learning and collaborative
knowledge building (Hewitt and Scardamalia, 1998; Scardamalia,
2002; Scardamalia and Bereiter, 2006) as two interrelated co-
evolutionary processes: When people co-construct knowledge
through shared digital artifacts, the learning processes of diﬀerent
individuals mutually inﬂuence each other (Halatchliyski et al.,
2014). Kimmerle et al. (2010a) introduced a distinction between
declarative and non-declarative knowledge and brieﬂy touched
on how knowledge co-evolution takes place for both of these
knowledge types within digital artifacts. In our analysis, we will
advance this approach and enrich it with further ﬁndings on
the co-evolution of declarative and non-declarative knowledge
within organizations.
The Co-evolution of Individual and Collective
Declarative Knowledge
Within structures where cognition is distributed among many
individuals, as in a corporate organization, the combination of
pieces of declarative knowledge held by diﬀerent individuals
enables the creation of new collective declarative knowledge
and ideas (Gibson, 2001). This knowledge creation is based on
diﬀerent cognitive and social mechanisms.
Schema theory and related concepts of mental representations
pervade contemporary research on cognition in organizations
(Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008); that is, individual declarative
knowledge is assumed to be stored in the form of cognitive
schemas (Bartlett, 1932; Greeno, 1980). A schema is a mental
model which contains an individual’s conjectures about the world
(Axelrod, 1973) and is regarded as a cognitive representation of
previous experiences with similar features (Gick and Holyoak,
1983). A schema allows an individual to infer information that
is not part of a current experience, based on existing knowledge
about previous, similar experiences (Greeno, 1980). As a mental
data structure, the schema guides the perception and processing
of stimuli from the environment, and all new knowledge is
interpreted against the backdrop of the existing schema. For
instance, a chef who has a cognitive schema of a “restaurant
kitchen” will be able to handle the oven and know which
ingredients are usually available in the storeroom and the freezer,
respectively, even when he enters the kitchen of a particular
restaurant for the ﬁrst time.
Based on neuropsychological studies, Ghosh and Gilboa
(2014) identiﬁed four necessary features of schemas. First,
schemas have an associative network structure; that is, they
comprise of units and their relationships. Second, schemas are
being developed on the basis of multiple experiences; they
represent the similarities and commonalities across events. Third,
schemas lack of unit detail, which follows from that they are
based on multiple experiences and episodes. Fourth, schemas are
adaptable; they are constantly developing, based on incoming
new information.
This adaptability of cognitive schemas is at the core of
how learning takes place in the declarative memory system.
Adaptation of a cognitive schema is triggered by an incongruity
between information encountered in the external world and
the prior knowledge of a person triggers a cognitive conﬂict;
this cognitive conﬂict leads to modiﬁcations in individual
cognitive structures through processes of accommodation or
assimilation (Piaget, 1977; Ghosh andGilboa, 2014). Assimilation
occurs when new information is added to the existing prior
knowledge without modiﬁcation of the existing schemas. In
an accommodation process, in contrast, existing schemas have
to be changed in order for new information to ﬁt. While
assimilation means accumulating additional information into
the existing structures, accommodation means that cognitive
systems typically become more complex or more sophisticated
(Rumelhart and Norman, 1978; Moskaliuk et al., 2009, 2011). For
example, an engineer in an automotive company may learn about
an improved (more eﬃcient) component for a fuel-injection
system in a combustion engine. This new knowledge may be
assimilated into her existing schema of “how engines work”,
because the basic principle of the engine’s functionality remains
unchanged from her point of view. However, if an engineer for
combustion engines acquires knowledge about the components
of an electric motor, the existing schema of “how engines work”
may become more complex in its accommodation of the new
information.
Individuals change their cognitive schemas (i.e., they learn)
as a result of their social interaction with their environment
(Zerubavel, 1997), especially through verbal communication
with other individuals. If individuals verbally communicate
with each other within structures of collectively distributed
cognition, it is likely that they are confronted with information
that is incongruent with their existing prior knowledge. As a
consequence, they may have to adapt their existing schemas in
order to resolve the cognitive conﬂict. To resolve the cognitive
conﬂict, individuals may either assimilate new information
into any prior knowledge or modify some existing knowledge
to accommodate new insights. In oral conversations, such
accommodation and assimilation processes are diﬃcult to
observe. However, these processes have been demonstrated in
situations where knowledge was being co-created via shared
digital artifacts (Kimmerle et al., 2010b).
On the basis of these ﬁndings, the following mechanisms
can be assumed to be at play in the development of
individual declarative knowledge within a co-evolution cycle:
Through verbal communication (in meetings, e-mails, and
documents), individuals may externalize speciﬁc parts of their
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declarative knowledge. This externalized knowledge may be
internalized by other people. During these internalization
processes, individuals use their existing cognitive schemas to
interpret novel information. An incongruity between existing
knowledge and new information may lead to a cognitive conﬂict.
This cognitive conﬂict then triggers adaptations of the cognitive
schema of the individual that experiences the conﬂict, either
through assimilation of new information into the existing schema
or accommodation of the schema.
As a consequence, repeated verbal communication within a
system of distributed cognition leads to the recursive adjustment
of individually held schemas within organizations, which then
become more and more alike over time (Zerubavel, 1997). That
is, individuals develop shared knowledge in the sense that parts
of their cognitive structures become similar over time. Besides
creating shared knowledge, individuals will build complementary
declarative knowledge as a consequence of task specialization,
based on a division of knowledge responsibilities (Lewis and
Herndon, 2011; Hecker, 2012).
In summary, we conclude from previous research that the
co-evolution of individual and collective declarative knowledge
within organizations happens mainly through individuals’
sharing knowledge with others through verbal communication,
including communication via shared artifacts that are verbally
coded. In this way, the knowledge of each individual expands in
assimilation and accommodation processes. Externalization and
internalization of knowledge lead to the recursive adjustment
of individually held schemas within organizations and to the
formation of collective declarative knowledge (Figure 1).
The Co-evolution of Individual and Collective
Non-declarative Knowledge
With regard to the co-evolution of individual and collective
non-declarative knowledge, the questions must be answered as
to how skills and habits are developed by individuals and how
they are related with collective non-declarative knowledge within
structures of distributed cognition.
Cognitive psychology has found that skills such as the
psychomotor skill of writing on a typewriter or the cognitive skill
of calculating the square-root of a two-digit number are acquired
FIGURE 1 | The co-evolution of individual and collective declarative
knowledge.
through exercise, that is, through repetition of the same activities
(Anderson, 1982; VanLehn, 1996; Sun et al., 2001; Wiggins et al.,
2014). Skill acquisition can be understood as skill composition,
that is, combining component skills in novel ways or adapting
already-known component skills to enable the performance of
new tasks (Salvucci, 2013).
Habits, as another form of non-declarative knowledge,
denote an individual’s customary ways of behaving
(Ouellette and Wood, 1998; Adriaanse et al., 2014). They
are controllable only to a limited extent, executed mostly
without awareness, and tend to be eﬃcient (Verplanken
and Orbell, 2003). For example, an experienced mechanic
will employ a very similar procedure each and every time
he changes the wheels of a car. Likewise, a head physician
will choose the same path every morning on the ward
round, ask similar questions and check the same medical
indicators.
Habits are intentional and goal-directed in their origins
(Ouellette and Wood, 1998), meaning that at the beginning of
the formation of a habit, a certain behavior (e.g., taking the
bus) was executed intentionally in order to achieve a particular
goal (e.g., getting to work). Like skills, habits are developed
through repetition (Ouellette and Wood, 1998; Wood and Neal,
2007). Danner et al. (2007, p. 1369) argue that “habit formation
occurs when the same means is repeatedly and consistently
retrieved for the same goal because it promotes an automatic
search for and access to these means in memory”. That is, by
satisfactory repetition, a certain practice may become habitual
(Verplanken and Orbell, 2003). When a habit has been formed,
a speciﬁc response is spontaneously triggered by speciﬁc cues
in the environment (Wood and Neal, 2007; Neal et al., 2012),
such as the wheel requiring changing together with the car in a
speciﬁc position in the mechanic example. Environmental cues
are essential for the habit-formation process.
Collective (distributed) non-declarative knowledge has been
the focus of a large body of research into formation of routine:
“the routine of a group can be viewed as the concatenation of
such procedurally stored actions, each primed by and priming
the actions of others” (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994, p. 557). The
knowledge that underlies the parts of the routine carried out by
the individual actors is often not articulated.
Routines appear prominently and persistently in the
description of organizational action and organizational learning
(Feldman, 2000; Becker, 2004; Cohen, 2007; Pentland et al.,
2011; Rerup and Feldman, 2011). Research into routine
formation has shown that the development of non-declarative
(individual) knowledge plays an important role in the formation
of organizational routines (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Cohen,
2012; Cohen et al., 2014). At the outset of the development of
organizational routines, individuals form goals and intentions
to act and perform a certain behavior to achieve these goals
(Ouellette and Wood, 1998; Bapuji et al., 2012). The feedback
about the behavior (success or failure) comes along with positive
or negative reinforcement, which may increase or decrease
the likelihood of its repetition. If successful, the repetition of
behavior may lead to the formation of individual habits and skills
after some trials.
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During the execution of a routine, individuals may
communicate verbally and non-verbally. Routine formation
is more likely if at the outset the intention of the routine
is clearly communicated and unambiguously conveyed by
“intermediaries” (Bapuji et al., 2012). Bapuji et al. (2012, p. 1589)
deﬁne an intermediary as “an entity that moves between actors
performing a task and transmits the intentions of one actor to
another”. Such intermediaries can take many forms, such as
computer software, contracts, or technological artifacts.
In collective practice, each individual triggers and carries
out some form of behavior to achieve a goal. Once a routine
has been established, the non-verbal behavior of one individual,
together with an intermediary, serves as behavioral “cue”
to other individuals who, in turn, trigger new behavior of
other individuals (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Bapuji et al.,
2012). Through repeated co-experience, the intentions of
the social interactions no longer need to be verbalized and
turn into reciprocal expectations (Thorngate, 1976; Howard-
Grenville, 2005). As an example for reciprocal expectations
in organizational learning, consider an experienced team of
ﬁreﬁghters trying to extinguish a ﬁre: When a ﬁreman starts
unwinding the ﬁre hose and runs to the source of the ﬁre,
he “knows” that a colleague in the ﬁre truck will turn on the
water in due course, because the colleague has done so in
many previous instances. In summary, existing research suggests
that individual non-declarative knowledge within organizations
develops through repeated individual practice. The co-evolution
of individual and collective non-declarative knowledge takes
place on the basis of repeated collective practice and mutual
reinforcement of habituated behavior which, over time, may lead
to the formation of reciprocal expectations and converge into
organizational routines (Figure 2).
The Relationship between Declarative and
Non-declarative Knowledge and Changes in
Organizational Practice
So far, we have described the diﬀerent mechanisms underlying
the co-evolution of declarative and non-declarative knowledge
within organizations. We have elaborated on the relationship
between knowledge and practice within organizations in general
FIGURE 2 | The co-evolution of individual and collective
non-declarative knowledge.
terms. The distinction between declarative and non-declarative
knowledge now allows us to reﬁne these general conclusions
about the relationship between knowledge and practice. In the
following, we will elaborate on diﬀerences between declarative
and non-declarative knowledge with regard to the modiﬁcation
of practice. For an overview in this context, Figure 3 summarizes
our main considerations.
Declarative Knowledge and Changes in
Organizational Practice
Organizational practice is based and dependent upon both
individual and collective declarative knowledge (Fiol and Lyles,
1985): Individuals rely on their existing factual and episodic
knowledge to perform organizational tasks. More complex tasks
may involve multiple individuals and require a combination of
the declarative knowledge of those individuals.
Reﬂection upon current (individual or collective) practice may
lead to the formation of new declarative knowledge (Dewey,
1933; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001; Høyrup, 2004; Knipfer
et al., 2013). In a given situation, an individual within an
organization may make a judgment concerning a situation at
hand and begin to search (consciously or unconsciously) for
an appropriate response (Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001). This
judgment may prove adequate if the expected results occur, or
inadequate if the expected results do not occur. If the expected
results do not occur the individual may experience a discrepancy
between the expected and the actual outcomes (Knipfer et al.,
2013); this discrepancy may result in cognitive discomfort. Such
cognitive discomfort is assumed to trigger a reﬂection process,
which may result in the creation of new declarative knowledge
(through modiﬁcation of existing schemas). Reﬂection may
take place individually or collectively (Renner et al., 2014). If
the outcomes of the reﬂective process are verbalized to other
individuals, this may trigger co-evolution cycles of declarative
knowledge.
Alterations in declarative knowledge may enable individuals
to articulate and achieve new individual and collective goals and
come up with novel strategies to achieve these goals. In this
way, new declarative knowledge has an impact on practice, in
that new intentions may be formed and new activities planned
and implemented. For example, an individual may realize that
an existing practice could be improved and may intentionally
modify his or her own existing (habituated) practice through
formulating new goals or thinking of new, more eﬃcient ways
to carry out previously automatized tasks. Such alterations
in declarative knowledge may not only lead to alterations
in individual practice, but may also result in the intention
to modify existing collective routinized behavior. A similar
mechanism was described by Gavetti and Levinthal (2000), who
modeled the process of how cognition-based decisions enable the
accumulation of experiences through modiﬁed practice. Whether
or not these intentional changes of organizational routines
actually lead to changes in organizational practice may depend on
diﬀerent factors, such as the alignment of the intended change in
performance with the original purpose of the routine (Feldman,
2003). When repeated, the new goal-oriented practices may lead
to the formation of new individual habits (Ouellette and Wood,
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FIGURE 3 | The interplay of declarative and non-declarative types of knowledge with practice.
1998; Wood and Neal, 2007; Neal et al., 2012) or collective
routines (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Bapuji et al., 2012).
Non-declarative Knowledge and Changes in
Organizational Practice
An even closer link exists between the formation of non-
declarative forms of knowledge and alterations in organizational
practice. Non-declarative knowledge, as we have explained above,
is built through repetition of practice. Both skills and habits can
be acquired only through practice and they can only manifest
themselves in practice. Repetition leads to the formation of
individual skills and habits and—through co-evolution cycles—to
collective routines which manifest in automatized practice.
Clearly, not all practice within organizations is automatized
and based on habit, but through by-passing cogitation habit
formation frees individuals to use their ﬁnite information-
processing capacity for other kinds of problem solving
(Thorngate, 1976; Argyris, 1977; Wood and Neal, 2007).
This gain in eﬃciency through automatization appears to be
particularly relevant under conditions of heavy load, such
as exhaustion, time pressure, distraction, or information
overload (Verplanken and Orbell, 2003). Successful outcomes
(through better skills and more eﬃcient procedures) increase
the likelihood of the pertinent behavior to occur. An equivalent
mechanism is involved in collective reinforcement learning from
the past, which also results in the formation of collective routines
(Feldman, 2000; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Pentland et al.,
2010, 2011). Therefore, within organizations—where there is
often a demand to deal quickly and eﬃciently with rather familiar
situations—there is a tendency toward reduction of complexity
and behavior is likely to become routinized.
Combining these observations, we conclude that existing non-
declarative knowledge, both at the individual (skills and habits)
and the collective levels (routines and reciprocal expectations),
enables organizations to employ practices and attain goals in
an automatic and eﬃcient way, with predictable outcomes and
products. The skills of the individuals involved in the routine
are thereby improved, automatization of individual and collective
behavior is reinforced, and reciprocal expectations develop.
Through repetition, non-declarative knowledge is formed
within organizations, which leads to increasing stabilization of
organizational practice (in the form of habits and routines).
While there is a tendency for habituation and routine
formation (through co-evolution cycles of non-declarative
knowledge), routinized practice does not necessarily have to be
rigid. On the contrary, routines have been found to be rather
ﬂexible entities (Feldman, 2000; Levinthal and Rerup, 2006;
Cohen, 2007; Pentland et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2012; Turner
and Fern, 2012): The basic structure of a routine can remain
relatively stable, while the actual manifestation of practice can
display substantial variety, as routines are being enacted anew in
each execution. Diﬀerent forms of variation in practice (Levinthal
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and Marino, 2015) may lead to the development of new skills and
modiﬁed habits. These newly generated skills and habits may in
turn shape the execution of the routine the next time around
(Levinthal and Rerup, 2006; Cohen, 2007; Miller et al., 2012).
Through improved skills, individuals may show new behaviors
or apply diﬀerent sub-procedures, which then slowly change the
routine as a whole.
Discussion and Conclusion
The intention of this article was to contribute to the further
development of the concrete individual and collective processes
underlying organizational learning by bringing the distinction of
declarative and non-declarative knowledge back into the debate.
Starting from the distinction of these two forms of knowledge, we
ﬁrst synthesized ﬁndings from organizational learning research
and cognitive psychology to show that co-evolution of individual
and collective knowledge diﬀers between declarative and non-
declarative knowledge: on the organizational level, collective
declarative knowledge (shared knowledge, complementary
knowledge, and knowledge documented in artifacts) evolves
mainly through verbal communication. Collective non-
declarative knowledge (collective routines and reciprocal
expectations) evolves mainly through repeated practice. Verbal
communication may incite cognitive conﬂicts in individual
cognitive schemas, which in turn trigger the development of
individual declarative knowledge through assimilation and
accommodation processes. Non-verbal forms of communication,
such as collaboration and co-experience in common tasks,
may result in the formation of individual habits and skills,
that is, individual non-declarative knowledge. In making this
distinction between declarative and non-declarative knowledge,
we include an analysis of individual level cognitive processes
(assimilation, accommodation, and formation of habits and
skills) in organizational learning, which have commonly been
ignored in contemporary socio-cognitive approaches.
As a second contribution, we have described the diﬀerent
eﬀects of declarative and non-declarative knowledge on the
formation of organizational practice. This integrative view
could serve to further enhance recent theoretical considerations.
For instance, it may add to the debate on “organizational
unlearning”, which has been described as the “discarding of
old routines to make way for new ones, if any” (Tsang and
Zahra, 2008, p. 1437; italics removed by the authors). Tsang
and Zahra (2008) explicitly state that organizational unlearning
incorporates behavioral and cognitive dimensions. They explain
that unreﬂective, habitual actions may be intentionally changed
or discarded as a consequence of “cognitive activities”. Applying
our integrative view allows us to be more speciﬁc about
this mechanism of intentional organizational unlearning: for
example, a certain practice may be changed as a consequence
of reﬂection, which leads to a modiﬁcation of declarative
knowledge; this new declarative knowledge, in turn, enables
planning and setting goals for new practices. Through repetition,
the new practice may lead to the development of non-declarative
knowledge (skills and habits). While this list of sub-processes
may not be complete, we suggest that these processes contribute
to the continuous variation of knowledge and practice within
organizations; and that our integrative perspective oﬀers starting
points for a more reﬁned understanding of the sub-processes
involved in (intentional) organizational unlearning.
In addition to oﬀering theoretical advancements, the
distinction between declarative and non-declarative knowledge
may support a better understanding of practical problems related
to organizational learning and change. For example, Blackman
et al. (2013) have analyzed the mechanisms underlying the
introduction of corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures
in organizations. In line with our co-evolution perspective,
they have suggested that individual mental models co-evolve
through accommodation and assimilation processes triggered
by cognitive dissonance. They have also identiﬁed a need for
unlearning and stated that individual habits may need to be
changed for corporate social behavior to be implemented. Such
an analysis could beneﬁt from a more precise distinction between
declarative and non-declarative forms of knowledge and from
our analysis of the interplay between diﬀerent types of knowledge
and practice within organizations.
A limitation of this article is the strict focus on cognitive
and communication processes. While we do acknowledge the
importance of physical and emotional aspects of individual and
collective learning processes (Elkjaer, 2004), these have not been
the focus of our attention. What we have also not included
in our analysis is the role of psychological predispositions that
have been suggested to mediate communication processes, such
as attitudes, emotional states, or personality traits (Craig, 1999;
Vince, 2001; Shipton and Sillince, 2012), as well as cognitive style
(Hayes and Allinson, 1998). In addition, interpersonal relations
and mechanisms such as trust or perceived authenticity may
have an impact on the verbal or non-verbal communication of
knowledge within organizations (Mazutis and Slawinski, 2008;
Obembe, 2013). Future work should analyze the role of emotions,
intrapersonal predispositions, and interpersonal relations in the
co-evolution of both declarative and non-declarative types of
knowledge and their relationship with organizational practice.
To conclude, organizational learning can be seen as a
complex, recursive process. Practice is based on knowledge,
the development of which is always a by-product of practice.
In a continuous cycle, modiﬁcations in behavior enable new
individual and collective experiences that, in turn, may lead to
the creation of new declarative and non-declarative knowledge.
While it is a challenge to grasp the many complex underlying
mechanisms, the conceptual analysis set forth in this article
provides a number of starting points for further theoretical
and empirical studies devoted to meeting this challenge.
Comprehension of the underlying processes will improve the
understanding of many knowledge-based phenomena that are the
foundations of organizational learning.
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